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I n t r o d u c t i o n . 
The purpose of the present paper is to develop a theory of 
expectations about interpersonal p o w e r , "power" in tne present 
sense means control over rewards and/or penalties that give one 
a c t o r , A , the capacity to Induce otherwise unwilling compliance 
uy a second a c t o r , 3 . A theory of expectations about power is 
concerned with assumptions by both A and B about its future use 
and compliance with its u s e . 
If A repeatedly promises a reward r to 3 if B will do X and 
threatens a penalty t to B if B does not do X , 3 will come in 
time to have expectations about (1) A's p r e f e r e n c e s — w h a t A will 
w i s n , r e q u e s t , d e m a n d , or direct; (2) what A will promis-e for 
compliance and/or threaten for noncompliance; and ( 3 ) the 
probability that A will or will not carry out such promises and 
t h r e a t s . In t u r n , A will come in time to have expectations about 
(H) B's p r e f e r e n c e s — w h a t B will easily d o , what B will resist; 
(5) the probability that B will or will not comply with A's 
wishes; and (6) what 3 will do in retaliation for A's promises or 
t h r e a t s . 
With sufficient t i m e , A and B each may further elaborate 
such "first-order" expectations by coming to nave expectations 
about the other's e x p e c t a t i o n s . A may come to expect that B 
expects certain preferences and r e s o u r c e s , and believes certain 
probabilities about their u s e . 3 may come to expect that A 
expects some particular rate of compliance and/or r e t a l i a t i o n . 
T h u s , second-order expectations also e m e r g e . 
But past experience of A with B and B with A is not the only 
way in which expectations e m e r g e . Expectations are 
t r a n s m i s s i b l e , nence need not depend on direct e x p e r i e n c e . In 
f a c t , expectations arise in at least H ways: (1) by direct 
experience of B with A and A with B; (2) by report of a third 
p a r t y , C , telling B about A or A about B; (3) by generalizing 
direct experience with people like A or B; or (1) by 
socialization into traditions about people liice A or B . 
The only theory of power to treat expectations about power 
at ail is the subjective expected utility (SEU) theory of power 
(iJagel, 1968; 1975; Pollard and M i t c h e l l , 1972; T e d e s c h i , et a l , 
1973). An SEU theory is a decision theory in which choice among 
alternatives is determined by their relative S E U . The SEU of an 
alternative is the sum of the products of the utility (i.e. 
subjective value) of each possible outcome of the choice weighted 
by the subjective probabilities of the o u t c o m e s . That 
alternative is preferred that has the highest S E U . O b v i o u s l y , 
subjective probabilities are a kind of expectation (for e x a m p l e , 
about the likelinood tnat promises or threats are carried o u t ) . 
But SEU theories neglect any other kind of e x p e c t a t i o n . 
SEU tiieories explain some important properties of power 
relations that are more difficult to explain by other theories of 
p o w e r . Magel ( 1 9 6 8 ; 1975), for e x a m p l e , is motivated to make SEU 
central to his theory in order to explain Friedrich'3 "law of 
anticipated reactions" ( 1937; 1963), in which tne rate of 
compliance by B is determined by B's expectations about A's 
exercise of power (as distinct from A's actual exercise of 
p o w e r ) . N e v e r t n e l e s s , the neglect of other kinds of expectations 
leads even SEU theories to understate the speed with which 
expectations about power come to define power r e l a t i o n s , the 
amount of power they create, and the stability of power (i.e. its 
rate of cnange); and to overstate tne visibility of power (i.e. 
the overt use of d i r e c t i v e s , promises, t h r e a t s , and 
r e t a l i a t i o n s ) . 
T h u s , our purpose in constructing a theory of expectations 
about power is to derive implications about e m e r g e n c e , a m o u n t , 
s t a b i l i t y , and visibility of power that go beyond existing 
theories of interpersonal p o w e r . Put slightly d i f f e r e n t l y , we 
frankly admit that we are guided by certain intuitions about 
power, derived from our own o b s e r v a t i o n s , with which others may 
or may not a g r e e . These intuitions are tnat: 
(1) Power is in some sense "sticky," i . e . in time 
tne amount of power of A over B becomes stable unless 
disturbed by exogenous f o r c e s . 
(2) Tnis implies that there is a process through which 
such stability e m e r g e s . But emergence sometimes appears 
i n s t a n t a n e o u s , at other times n o t . Roth kinds of 
emergence require e x p l a n a t i o n . 
( 3 ) As stable power e m e r g e s , it increases in effect; it 
tends to become a m p l i f i e d , tne same resources creating 
more c o m p l i a n c e . 
(4) At the same t i m e , power becomes less and less v i s i b l e , 
i . e . there is less overt expression of p r e f e r e n c e s , 
p r o m i s e s , and t h r e a t s , and less actual use of p e n a l t i e s . 
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In other w o r d s , we regard as unsatisfactory any theory that does 
not imply these intuitions about power and the goal of 
constructing an alternative theory is to explain these four 
p r o p e r t i e s . 
Tne paper is divided into four p a r t s . In part i we very 
selectively review the existing literature on interpersonal 
p o w e r . This will prove tedious for tne reader already familiar 
with i t , who may wish to skip directly to part i i . H o w e v e r , the 
purpose of part i is largely to motivate part i i , i . e . to show 
that in fact existing tneory does not adequately explain what we 
intuitively believe about tne s t a b i l i t y , e m e r g e n c e , a m o u n t , or 
visibility of p o w e r . In part ii we formulate a theory of 
expectations about p o w e r . In part iii we derive from it 
implications about s t a b i l i t y , e m e r g e n c e , amount and visibility of 
p o w e r . F i n a l l y , in part iv we consider some of the factors that 
increase or decrease the magnitude of the effects that 
expectations have on p o w e r . 
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Part I. Theories of Interpersonal P o w e r . 
A. Concepts of P o w e r . 
we need to locate the sense in which we use the term "power" 
in relation to the large literature on the subject before going 
any f u r t n e r . Few words have more meanings: For Russell (1938), 
power is simply the capacity to pursue and accomplish a goal 
(individual or collective); a sense sometimes referred to as the 
"power t o . . . " . Tnis sense of the term recurs in Hawley ( 1963) 
and Parsons ( 1963), for whom it means the power to pursue 
collective g o a i s , and again in Pouxantzas (1973) and Lukes (1975) 
for both of whom it is the capacity of a class to realize its 
i n t e r e s t s . (This kind of power is called "macro" power by m a n y , 
e . g . L e h m a n , 1969.) It is used in quite a different sense in 
rt'eber ( 1 9 4 7 ) and Dahi (1957) who both use it to refer to 
interpersonal p o w e r , often referred to as "power o v e r . . . " . Weber 
uses it to refer to potential power (what one actor could do to 
a n o t h e r ) while Dahl refers to actual power (power u s e ) , but both 
use tne term very broadly to refer to any kind of change in 
behavior of one actor caused by a n o t n e r . H e n c e , p e r s u a s i o n , 
i n d u c e m e n t , c o e r c i o n , a u t h o r i t y , m a n i p u l a t i o n , and force are all 
"power." In French and Raven (1959) we find some of these kinds 
of power distinguisned from others because persuasion behaves 
differently than rewards and punishments which behave differently 
from a u t h o r i t y . It is for this reason that Festinger (1953) uses 
the term more narrowly for "forced" or "unwilling" c o m p l i a n c e , 
r~ 
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compliance that is public but not p r i v a t e , and Harsanyi uses it 
to refer to compliance induced by desire for rewards or fear of 
penalties (as opposed to persuasion or acceptance of a u t h o r i t y , 
both of which are e x t r i n s i c , as distinct from i n t r i n s i c , motives 
for c o m p l i a n c e . It is in the Festinger-Harsanyi sense tnat we 
use the term in tne present paper.
< _ 
B . Theories of P o w e r . 
(1) P r e l i m i n a r i e s . 
It will help to bring some order into the confusion of 
contemporary theories of interpersonal pov/er to distinguish first 
of ail between theories of acts of compliance and theories of 
power-dependence r e l a t i o n s . The l a t t e r , of which Emerson's 
power-dependence theory is the most important (Emerson 1962; 
1972; Cook and E m e r s o n , 1978), is essentially a structural theory 
and does not deal with t a c t i c s , a c t s , or even sequences of acts 
(as pointed out forcefully by Bacharach and L a w l e r , 1980; 1981). 
The f o r m e r , on the other h a n d , is concerned with units of a c t i o n , 
not s t r u c t u r e , and analyzes power as choice (in decision 
t n e o r i e s ) or as particular instances of compliance to particular 
instances of tne exercise of power (in field and behavioral 
t h e o r i e s ) . 
While power-dependence theory stands more or less in a class 
by itself as an analysis of r e l a t i o n s , there is a considerable 
profusion of theories of compliant a c t i o n . These fall into three 
groups: Field t h e o r i e s , which conceptualize acts such as 
compliance in terms of the state at a given moment of a field of 
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forces (in the psychological s e n s e ) and power as the capacity to 
affect the f o r c e s , or v a l e n c e s , in the field (as in C a r t w r i g h t , 
1959; or French and R a v e n , 1959); behavioral exchange t h e o r i e s , 
which conceptualize behavior such as compliance in terms of 
reinforcement contingencies and power in terms of control over 
these contingencies (as in H o m a n s , 1961, c h . 5); and decision 
t h e o r i e s , which conceptualize behavior as choices determined by 
the value or utility of o u t c o m e s , weighted in some instances by 
tne probability of the o u t c o m e s , and power by control over these 
outcomes (as in 3 x a u , 1964; H a r s a n y i , 1962; T e d e s c h i , et a l , 
1973; Thibaut and K e l l e y , 1959). 
In practice it has proved difficult to empirically 
distinguish among f i e l d , b e h a v i o r a l , and decision theories of 
p o w e r . There are substantial similarities in their u n d e r l y i n g 
structure and they differ little in their implications (Crosbie, 
1975, 344-355; S c h o p l e r , 1 9 6 5 ) . More useful are distinctions 
among various kinds of decision t h e o r y , some of which define 
value objectively and some s u b j e c t i v e l y , some of which define 
choice J e t e r m i n i s t i c a l l y and some s t o c h a s t i c a l l y , some of the 
latter defining prooabiiity objectively and some s u b j e c t i v e l y . 
There are material d i f f e r e n c e s , for e x a m p l e , between theories 
like (1) Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) which are d e t e r m i n i s t i c , 
o b j e c t i v e , "value," theories and (2) theories like Harsanyi's 
( 1 9 6 2 ) which are s u b j e c t i v e , or "utility" theories although also 
deterministic; between both these kinds of theories and (3) 
stochastic value models like March's (1955) or (4) stochastic 
utility tneories like Alker's (1973), in which the probabilities 
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are objective; and between all these and (5) subjective expected 
utility t h e o r i e s , like T e d e s c h i , et al (1973), in which value is 
s u b j e c t i v e , choice is p r o b a b i l i s t i c , and the probabilities are 
s u b j e c t i v e . 
In reviewing this literature our only purpose is to motivate 
interest in four problems to which we believe expectations are a 
s o l u t i o n . For this p u r p o s e , it is sufficient to selectively 
review just three kinds of theory of power, (1) power-dependence 
t h e o r i e s , ( 2 ) deterministic utility t h e o r i e s , and ( 3 ) 
s u b j e c t i v e - e x p e c t e d utility t h e o r i e s . Our interest in these 
tneories is in how little power-dependence tneory has to say 
about these problems and how much utility and 
s u b j e c t i v e - e x p e c t e d - u t i l i t y theory underestimate (a) the 
e m e r g e n c e , (b) tne a m o u n t , and (c) the stability of power and 
overestimate (d) its v i s i b i l i t y . 
(2) Power-Dependence T h e o r y . 
Power-dependence theory treats power in such a way that its 
use is i n v i s i b l e , its amount often greater than any particular 
promised reward or threatened p e n a l t y , and its emergence 
i n s t a n t a n e o u s . These are ail properties that w e , in e f f e c t , 
claim a theory of power ought to h a v e . But the theory predicts 
that power is stable only if it is e q u a l , which seems to us 
highly i m p r o b a b l e , and it is a somewhat unsatisfactory solution 
to the questions of u s e , a m o u n t , and emergence because it tends 
to rise above rather than answer t h e m . It is a theory of 
s t r u c t u r e , not action; its principle difficulty is in fact in 
linking acts to structure (Bachrach and L a w l e r , 198O, 1 9 8 1 ) . 
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Power-aependence theory is founded on a theory of exchange 
r e l a t i o n s . It is concerned with two a c t o r s , A and B; two a c t s , x 
and y; and four subjective values, Ax, Ay, bx, B y . If X is the 
amount of x that is traded oy A to B for the amount Y of y , an 
exchange at a given price (ratio of values of amounts traded) 
occurs if and only if AyY - AxX > 0 and BxX - ByY > 0 . If 
exchange between A and B acquires both a past history and a 
prospective future, Ax;By is an exchange r e l a t i o n . It is the 
concept of an exchange relation that sets Emerson's 
power-dependence theory apart from theories of compliant a c t i o n s . 
Emerson's sociology is a study of social r e l a t i o n s , not acts or 
p e r s o n s . 
Power in an exchange relation depends on resources and their 
c o n t r o l . A resource is any a c t , a t t r i b u t e , or object that is 
instrumental to accomplishing the ends of an a c t o r . Power 
depends on the fact that resources are sometimes controlled by 
o t h e r s . Its amount depends on the extent of B's dependence on A, 
which in turn depends on two factors: It increases as the 
subjective value to B of a resource of A's increases, but 
decreases as the number of alternative sources of the resource 
increases. Power is of course a reciprocal r e l a t i o n , hence each 
actor is to some extent dependent on the o t h e r . T h e r e f o r e , a 
second factor decreasing A's power over B is A's dependency on B , 
But the less dependent actor is the more powerful: T h u s , the 
basic principle of the theory is that P(AB) = D ( B A ) , where P(AB) 
is the power of A over B and D(BA) is the dependence of B on A. 
Assuming that A is the less d e p e n d e n t , more powerful a c t o r , the 
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power advantage of A over B is P(AB) - P ( B A ) , or e q u i v a l e n t l y , 
D(BA) - 0(AB)„ It is this advantage (which can be 0) which 
drives all behavior in the t h e o r y . 
This power advantage r e f e r s , h o w e v e r , to potential p o w e r , 
not power in u s e . (Cf H o l m , 1985.) The basic theorem of the 
theory is true only if (a) one assumes all potential power is 
used or (b) one uses it to refer only to s t r u c t u r e . Cook and 
E m e r s o n , for e x a m p l e , assume use is equal to potential in 
deriving steady-state transactions between A and B at the point 
at which AyY - AxX = BxX - ByY (Cook and E m e r s o n , 1978). Their 
e x p e r i m e n t s are constructed to eliminate constraints on the 
actual use of p o w e r . But there is clearly a difference between 
power at any point (except the e q u i l i b r i u m ) and the steady state 
because both A and B undergo changes in the subjective value of 
resource as the number of transactions i n c r e a s e s . Nor can the 
theory predict actual use of power even at the steady s t a t e . It 
simply i3 not a theory aDout the use of power in the sense of 
making d e m a n d s , making p r o m i s e s , making threats, giving r e w a r d s , 
penalizing o t h e r s . Michaels and W i g g i n s , (197b) and Burgess and 
rtielson, (1974) (all of whom are in the Emerson t r a d i t i o n ) argue 
Me believe c o r r e c t l y , that the theory is purely a structural 
t h e o r y , describing characteristics of r e l a t i o n s , and the 
"balancing" operations Emerson incorporated into it do not in 
fact logically derive from it without further assumptions about 
use of p o w e r . Emerson himself, in discussing power "use" makes 
it ciear that what he means by "use" is not use in the sense of 
using or withholding rewards contingently (which is Molm's 
attempt to define use in power-dependence terms), but, 
e s s e n t i a l l y , the amount of e x p l o i t a t i o n , however brought a b o u t . 
(See E m e r s o n , 1972, 1 9 8 5 . ) 
The "balancing operations" just mentioned refer to various 
means by which inequality in power can be r e d u c e d , for example by 
forming coalitions or d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g s t a t u s , Emerson carries 
the idea of r e a c t a n c e , that the exercise of power creates 
resistance (Brehm, 19bo), to its logical conclusion: A 
power-advantage of A over B is defined in Emerson as an 
"imbalance," and the theory supposes that power relations tend 
towards b a l a n c e . Asymmetric relations are therefore u n s t a b l e , 
giving rise to pressures towards change until an equilibrium 
state is reached at which P(AB) - P(BA) r 0 . 
T h u s , power in power-dependence theory is inherently 
u n s t a b l e . It has a certain stability by comparison with any 
theory of compliant actions because it deals with p o t e n t i a l , 
rather than actual power, with relations rather than a c t s , and is 
therefore i s s u e - f r e e . It does not vary with the utility of X at 
any particular time to either A or B, nor with tne amounts of r 
and t exchanged on particular o c c a s i o n s . But there are at least 
four ways in w h i c h , n e v e r t h e l e s s , potential power is unstable, 
f i r s t , the objective stock of A's resources may change over time 
as they are consumed by B. S e c o n d , some resources, like 
i n f o r m a t i o n , change the value of D(BA) over time because they are 
not consumed in use, but their transfer is irreversible, hence 
they become resources of B (Palmier, 1963). (Both factors are 
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true in iny theory of power w h a t e v e r , not only power-dependence 
theory.) T h i r d , motivational investments, on which dependence 
r e s t s , change with time. And fourth, imbalanced relations are in 
any case u n s t a b l e , giving rise to changes in power that continue 
until A and B are equal in power. 
Stability is the one q u e s t i o n , h o w e v e r , that 
power-dependence theory addresses d i r e c t l y . We have a l r e a d y said 
that it is essentially silent on u s e . Power is invisible in the 
theory because it is not about a c t s . The same can be said for 
amount and emergence of p o w e r . The theory deals more 
satisfactorily with the problem of the amount of power than any 
other because it focusses on potential rather than actual power. 
But the amount of potential p o w e r , P ( A B ) , is in 1:1 
correspondence with the a m o u n t , u t i l i t y , and sources of A's 
r e s o u r c e s . Repeated use creates no "amplification" of the amount 
over t i m e . And emergence is instantaneous largely because there 
is no action in the t h e o r y . 
Bacharach and Lawier (1980; 19b1) have attempted to fill the 
gap between structure and action by linking Emerson's 
power-dependence hypotheses to acts in bargaining r e l a t i o n s . 
They argue that the development of tactical implications of 
power-dependence theory depend on the cognitive (as distinct from 
behavioral) side of d e p e n d e n c e , which they deduce from the 
factors that determine behavioral dependence and use to predict 
choices among tactical o p t i o n s . Earlier studies of perceived 
power had led Bacharach and Lawier to conclude that the perceived 
power of A over B is an increasing function of the values of the 
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alternatives (to each side) and a decreasing function of the 
nuraoer of alternatives available (to each side). (See Bacharach 
and L a w l e r , 1976; Lawler and B a c h a r a c h , 1976; 1979; M i c h e n e r , et 
a i , 1973.) Such perceived power determines tactical choices by 
a n t i c i p a t i n g probable choices by the o t h e r , likelihood of 
s u c c e s s , e t c . 
But the implication of Bacharach and Lawler's method is that 
perceived power is in 1:1 correspondence with d e p e n d e n c e , hence 
power. Its properties are therefore like the properties of 
power-dependence relations: not very v i s i b l e , and immediately 
emergent; but the amount of power is unstable and emergence adds 
nothing to the a m o u n t . In a s e n s e , Bachrach and Lawler do not 
take enough advantage of their Disic idea: The only factors 
which enter their equations are those of power-dependence 
a n a l y s i s . SuDjective p r o b a b i l i t y , for e x a m p l e , which had been 
introduced into this kind of analysis by M i c h e n e r , et a l , 1973, 
drops out of Bacharach and Lawler's later a n a l y s i s of perceived 
power. This results in a too-limited analysis of the process by 
which perceptions and expectations emerge and come to govern the 
exercise of and compliance with p o w e r . Among the elements that 
are missing are (1) effects of reputations for power on perceived 
p o w e r , hence (2) perceptions of power that are not linear 
functions of objective amounts of resources and a l t e r n a t i v e s , and 
(3) subjective probabilities of power use and compliance which 
are determined by indirect as opposed to direct experience and 
are therefore not linear functions of objective p r o b a b i l i t i e s . 
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(3) Deterministic Utility T h e o r i e s . 
The elements of a utility theory of power are a c t o r s , A and 
B , their a c t s , X and Y , and unique outcomes of these a c t s . The 
outcomes have values which are rewards if they benefit actors and 
penalties if they disbenefit t h e m . (Penalties forgone are 
rewards and rewards forgone are penalties.) The motivation to 
engage in any activity (including interaction i t s e l f ) depends on 
the relative utility one expects to gain from i t , where the 
utility of an act is the algebraic sum of the rewards and 
penalties associated with i t . Given a choice between acts X and 
Y , every actor chooses that course of action that yields the 
greatest u t i l i t y . Interaction between A and B is governed by the 
same p r i n c i p l e , hence occurs if and only if it yields each actor 
the greatest available u t i l i t y . But the important thing about 
"choice" in a utility theory is the comparison of alternatives: 
What looks to an observer like an unattractive course of action 
may be chosen by A or B because it is preferable to its 
a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
This is an important fact in u n d e r s t a n d i n g power and 
c o m p l i a n c e , which often involves choice between the lesser of two 
e v i l s . "Power" flows from control over rewards and c o s t s , from 
the capacity to induce acts by promise of reward or threat of 
p e n a l t y . In Harsanyi's t h e o r y , for e x a m p l e , which is probably 
the most elegant utility t h e o r y , A offers reward r to B if B will 





 a n d 
threatens penalty t if B persists in performing X at rate p ^ . 
B's compliance is proportional to (r + t ) / x , where x is the 
-14-
disutility to B of doing X . That is, it is a monotonically 
increasing function of the rewards for doing X and penalties for 
not d o i n g X and a decreasing function of the disutility to B of 
X. B will therefore perform X at the rate p^ if and only if 
r - p ^ x > - t - p - | X . 
But power is even more unstable in utility theories than in 
p o w e r - d e p e n d e n c e theory. There is no balance assumption in 
Utility t h e o r y , no endogenous pressure for c h a n g e . But utility 
theory has most of the same sources of instability as 
p o w e r - d e p e n d e n c e theory and at least one that power-dependence 
theory doesn't h a v e . 
There are three sources of change in the amount of power in 
utility theories (aside from differences in u(X^)): F i r s t , the 
values of r and t change with time (as they also do in behavioral 
exchange theories such as H o m a n s , 196l--see the analysis by 
C r o s b i e , 1972). The whole point of a u t i l i t y , as distinct from a 
v a l u e , formulation is the law of m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y . The value of 
r decreases with the frequency of r. The behavior of t is 
complicated by the fact that if it consists in withholding r its 
value may increase rather than decrease with frequency but it 
n e v e r t h e l e s s fluctuates with t i m e . S e c o n d , the supply of rewards 
and penalties changes over t i m e . If A uses them without 
replacement the stock d e c r e a s e s . But as the stock decreases the 
m a r g i n a l costs to A of a promise or threat increases. But third, 
the impermanence of power is even greater in utility than in 
power-dependence theories because the effects of power are 
determined by the amount of r and t on each specific o c c a s i o n . 
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The unit of analysis is the a c t , not the r e l a t i o n . Each act is 
independent of any other a c t , is without reference to either the 
past or the future, except for frequency. Saturation (in 
oehavioral terms) or m a r g i n a l utility (in decision theory terms) 
determines the value of r and t, but in all other respects each 
unit act occurs as if it had no past and holds no consequences 
for the future. 
Unlike power-dependence t h e o r y , utility theories imply (or 
p e r h a p s , more e x a c t l y , require) i high level of visibility of 
p o w e r . Because of the focus on a unit a c t , the process is 
described as an act by 3 in response to a threat/promise by A, 
which depends on an actual reward/penalty by A . T h r o u g h o u t , no 
matter now often the sequence has been repeated in the p a s t , 
compliance occurs because of a demand by A and depends on a c t u a l 
use of p o w e r . There is no potential p o w e r , no law of anticipated 
r e a c t i o n s , no compliance without overt exercise of p o w e r . 
The process does not even depend on A's stock of r e s o u r c e s , 
except is it affects A's costs by d e p l e t i o n . Each act is 
determined entirely by (r + t ) / x . There are theories (like 
P a r s o n s ' theory of power as a system of c r e d i t , P a r s o n s , 1963) in 
which resources are pyramided by the reputation they c r e a t e , the 
faith they build u p , and the resources obtained from others by 
previous use of p o w e r , but none of these factors operate in a 
deterministic utility theory of p o w e r , which depends only on the 
value at a given instant of r, t , and x. For the same r e a s o n , 
power may be thought of in such theories as power instantaneously 
created and as instantaneously d i s s i p a t i n g . One cannot speak of 
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it as "emergent": It is a continuous process in time (as opposed 
to a process that creates "expectations" w h i c h , when a c t i v a t e d , 
determine b e h a v i o r ) . 
(4) Subjective Expected Utility T h e o r i e s . 
A "Subjective Expected Utility" theory is a stochastic 
theory of power in which the values and the probability of 
outcomes are both subjective (Nagel, 1968; 1975; Pollard and 
M i t c h e l l , 1972; T e d e s c h i . et a l , 1973). T h u s , utility affects 
choices to an extent weighted by the subjective probability that 
the outcome to which the utility is attached w i l l o c c u r . A 
utility o f , s a y , 100 will have less effect than one o f , s a y , 10 
if the probability that 100 occurs is .001 while the probability 
that 10 occurs is 1.00 because (.001 x 100) < (1.00 x 10). As 
Nagel (1968) n o t e s , an SEU theory makes it possible to reason 
that B complies with A's "demands" without A openly promising 
rewards or threatening penalties because B , based on prior 
e x p e r i e n c e , is able to anticipate A's reactions (captured by the 
subjective probability of an o u t c o m e ) . B infers A's probable 
future behavior based on a knowledge of A's preferences and B's 
subjectively held beliefs about the probability of a reward for 
compliance or penalty for n o n c o m p l i a n c e . (This hypothesis is 
confirmed by F o r d , 1936.) F u r t h e r m o r e , A is as capable of 
inferring B's probable future conduct as B is A ' s . T h e r e f o r e , 
power is less overtly e x e r c i s e d . Not only is it less needed from 
B's point of v i e w , it is also less needed from A ' s . In a 
deterministic utility t h e o r y , A exercises power every time A 
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believes s/he will gain from B's c o m p l i a n c e . The rate at which 
power is exercised is an increasing function of the utility of an 
outcome of B's actions to A and a decreasing function of the cost 
to A of the exercise of power (in terms of alternatives forgone, 
for e x a m p l e ) . In an SEU theory of p o w e r , A exercises power 
whenever the SEU of its use is greater than the SEU of not using 
power (Tedeschi, et a l , 1973)• But the factors determining the 
use of power include the utility to A of B's c o m p l i a n c e , the 
costs to A of B's n o n c o m p l i a n c e , the costs of exercising p o w e r , 
the probability of success if power is exercised and the 
probability of retaliation if B resists c o m p l i a n c e . In 
c o n s e q u e n c e , there is a law of anticipated reactions for A just 
as for B (pointed out by D a h i , 195b; 1961); and A may be supposed 
(1) not to make demands that cannot be enforced and (2) not to 
openly make promises/threats when B will comply without overt 
exercise of power. 
An SEU theory therefore predicts much less visibility of 
power than deterministic utility theories do, and it also implies 
more s t a b i l i t y . Subjective probabilities are beliefs that, once 
formed, are capable of persistence; knowledge of preferences also 
p e r s i s t s . T o g e t h e r , they imply that power fluctuates less from 
occasion to occasion than deterministic utility theories imply. 
But SEU theory faces serious measurement problems and 
applications of the theory in practice tend to undermine its more 
powerful i m p l i c a t i o n s . (For a review of these measurement 
problems see C o o m b s , Dawes, and T v e r s k y , 1970, pp. 129-137, 
145-147.) In p r a c t i c e , it is typically assumed that "the average 
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of the subjective utilities and subjective probabilities should 
approximate the objective values and probabilities" (Tedeschi, et 
a l , 1973, 5 7 ) . In p r a c t i c e , therefore, investigators tend to 
lose sight of the distinctive value of the theory. Of even more 
far-reaching consequence is the fact that the theory assumes 
subjective probability is founded in the specific history of the 
AB relation (except N a g e l , 19b8). The result is that many other 
sources of expectations for A's and B's behavior are treated as 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t . The theory therefore implies that at each new 
encounter between previously unacquainted A and B the process 
begins as if it had no h i s t o r y . It takes time for subjective 
estimates of another's preferences and probable actions to 
e m e r g e . And it remains true, as in deterministic utility 
theories, that A's stock of resources plays no role in the theory 
except that its depletion affects A's c o s t s . 
T h u s , SEU theories depend more on past events and 
expectation of future events than deterministic utility theories, 
hence are not committed to analyzing power in terms only of unit 
c h o i c e s , and they incorporate a kind of expectation (subjective 
anticipations of r e a c t i o n s ) that increases stability and 
decreases visibility of power. But they still tend to 
underestimate the effects of expectations because they begin 
sequences of events between A and B as if history begins always 
at the b e g i n n i n g . One of the important ways in which 3n 
e x p e c t a t i o n , once introduced, makes a difference is that it can 
be transmitted to o t h e r s , hence can operate on them before the 
specific history of a relation has even b e g u n . 
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(5) Summary and C o n c l u s i o n s . 
We regard a theory of power as satisfactory if it can 
explain four features that we intuitively believe to be true of 
power: 
(1) It is relatively s t a b l e , 
(2) sometimes emerging i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y , but sometimes n o t , 
(3) a m p l i f y i n g the amount of power as it becomes s t a b l e , 
(4) at the same time decreasing its v i s i b i l i t y . 
Power-dependence theory predicts instant e m e r g e n c e , and 
virtual invisibility of p o w e r , but no amplification of the amount 
of power and assumes pressures towards instability of asymmetric 
power. T h u s , it does not explain those instances in which 
emergence is not i n s t a n t a n e o u s , perhaps outdoes our intuitions 
about v i s i b i l i t y , and understates both the amount and stability 
of power. Bacharach and Lawler's (1980, 1981) attempts to link 
power-dependence relations to particular acts of c o m p l i a n c e , 
although taking perceptions of power into a c c o u n t , have the same 
tendency to understate stability and amount of p o w e r . 
In utility theories there is no stability at a l l , no 
e m e r g e n c e , no a m p l i f i c a t i o n , and power is always v i s i b l e . T h u s , 
they explain none of the properties we intuitively attribute to 
power. 
SEU theories match our intuitions better than other 
t h e o r i e s , but still underestimate s t a b i l i t y , have only one kind 
of emergence (explaining it only when it is comparatively s l o w ) , 
underestimate the amplification of power created by e m e r g e n c e , 
but still overestimate the visibility of p o w e r . 
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PART I I . E x p e c t a t i o n s , Shared A w a r e n e s s , and Power 
We shall model a process in which one a c t o r , A , directs 
a n o t h e r , B , to do X . By h y p o t h e s i s , B attaches sufficient 
disutility to X that B would not do X were it not for either 
promises of r e w a r d , r , for doing X or threats of p e n a l t y , t, for 
not doing X , or b o t h . A's requests or d i r e c t i v e s , promises 
and/or t h r e a t s , rewards and/or penalties are referred to as A's 
e x e r c i s e , or u s e , of power and B's behavior is referred to as B's 
c o m p l i a n c e , if B does X , or n o n c o m p l i a n c e , if B does not do X . B 
also may use p o w e r , as retaliation for A's threats and/or 
resistance to A's d i r e c t i v e s . 
Both A's and B's behavior are thought of in the theory as 
choices among alternative courses of a c t i o n . That i s , it is 
assumed that each alternative is in principle p o s s i b l e , any 
alternative could in principle o c c u r . Perfectly 
institutionalized behavior is outside the scope of this kind of 
theory and a l t e r n a t i v e s that are made impossible by a given 
social structure are not among the alternatives the theory 
t r e a t s . H e n c e , the probability of a "choice" is to begin with 
neither 0 nor 1. 
The choice of a course of action by A and by B is assumed to 
depend in the first instance on the subjective expected utility 
of the outcomes associated with each a c t i o n . That i s , each 
alternative X^ is associated with one or more o u t c o m e s , . 
Each o u t c o m e , O-^j, is associated with a subjective v a l u e , called 
a u t i l i t y , If there is a unique outcome for each 
a l t e r n a t i v e , it is assumed that each actor chooses that 
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alternative that has the most preferred o u t c o m e , i . e . for which 
u ( 0
i
) is g r e a t e s t . (If the actor is indifferent between 
alternative o u t c o m e s , it is assumed that s/he alternates equally 
among them.) But alternatives may have more than one o u t c o m e , 
i . e . choice may only probabilistically determine the o u t c o m e . 
While there may be a true probability distribution over the 
o u t c o m e s , in SEU theory it is assumed that actors do not know 
this d i s t r i b u t i o n . They d o , h o w e v e r , have subjective 
probabilities associated with each possible outcome of each 
possible c h o i c e , which we denote b y ^ j . But it is assumed that 
if the "outcome" of a choice is itself decomposable into parts, 
the utility of a choice is a linear combination of (1) the 
utility of each o u t c o m e , (2) weighted by its subjective 
p r o b a b i l i t y , i . e . E ^ j U ^ . If we accept as axiomatic the 
principle that actors chose that alternative that has the most 
preferred o u t c o m e , it seems reasonable to suppose that in the 
probabilistic case they chose that alternative that has the best 
expected o u t c o m e . That i s , they should be expected to choose the 
alternative that is associated with the largest value of Zip^u^. 
Although virtually all decision theories will have this same 
basic f r a m e w o r k , it is worth noting that they differ considerably 
in what elements enter the choice function and how the function 
itself is f o r m u l a t e d . In particular, virtually any theory of 
"choice" in one way or another assumes that the actor is driven 
to choose X.^  by all the positive features associated with it but 
is driven away from X.^  by all its negative f e a t u r e s . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , one may also think of the actor as driven toward X^. 
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by all the negative features of its a l t e r n a t i v e s . In C a m i l l e r i , 
B e r g e r , and C o n n e r , 1972, this idea underlies how gains are 
c o m p u t e d . But there are obviously many functions which might 
represent this i d e a . That i s , in any choice theory the choice of 
Xj. depends as much on what the actor does not like about its 
alternatives as about what the actor does like about X
i
. But in 
the simplest such f u n c t i o n , which is the one we have adopted as 
our starting p o i n t , this is implicit rather than e x p l i c i t . We do 
not ourselves have any interest in the question of what choice 
function is best and believe that our theory will have the same 
implications regardless of which is c h o s e n . What we like about 
the function we are using is simply that it is so t r a n s p a r e n t . 
If, as we are s u p p o s i n g , A prefers that B do X while B 
prefers not to do X , it follows that whether or not B actually 
does X depends on the utilities of r and t and the 
probabilities with which r follows compliance and t follows 
n o n c o m p l i a n c e . That i s , B should do X if and only if the 
expected utility of r + t exceeds the difference in utility 
between X and its most preferred a l t e r n a t i v e , u ( X ) - u ( X ) . 
(Without loss of generality we can speak simply of two 
a l t e r n a t i v e s . ) For in general, B will do X if and only if 
Eifi^jU(X) > Z ^
i
j u ( X ) . Assuming that absent r and t , u(X)> u ( X ) , B 
will therefore do X if and only if u(X) + <pu(r) > u(X) - ijm(t).
1 
E q u i v a l e n t l y , B will do X if and only if 
* u ( r ) + *u(t)
 >
 u(X) - u ( X ) . 
On A's s i d e , whether A actually attempts to use his/her 
power to compel compliance by B will depend in the first instance 
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on the subjective expected utility of X to A and on the cost of 
obtaining B's c o m p l i a n c e . ("Cost" here refers simply to the 
marginal utility to A of r and t.) This should depend in part on 
the probability that B c o m p l i e s , because the actual use of r and 
t depends on whether B complies or n o t . If the subjective 
probability of B's compliance is ,j,
x
 A should exercise power over 
B if and only if u(X) - u ( T ) > *
v
u ( r ) + ?
v
u ( t ) . 
T h u s , taking SEU theory as a starting p o i n t , we assume first 
of all that 
Assumption 1. (SEU a s s u m p t i o n ) . For given X , r , and t , 
1. B complies with preferences of A that s/he do X if 
and only if 
* u ( r ) + < M t ) > u(X) - u ( X ) . 
2. A promises r to B for doing X and/or threatens t 
if B does not do X if and only if 
u ( X ) - u(X) • *
x
u ( r ) + *
x
u ( t ) , 
where 1> is B's subjective probability that A a c t u a l l y rewards 
c o m p l i a n c e , which may or may not differ from B's subjective 
probability that A actually penalizes n o n c o m p l i a n c e , and • is 
A's subjective probability that B actually complies with the 
directive to do X and * = 1 - • 
A A 
If now we assume that this interaction is repeated a number 
of t i m e s , or that others like it are reported to A and B , or that 
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traditions about it are transmitted from the past to A and B , we 
can also assume that A and B develop expectations about what the 
other will want and will d o . We refer to these as first-order 
expectations when we speak of (1) B's expectations about A's 
p r e f e r e n c e s , A's resources (i.e. A's stock of r e w a r d s / p e n a l t i e s ) , 
the probability that A uses these r e s o u r c e s , and the probability 
that A complies with B's own preferences (for e x a m p l e , if B 
attempted counter threats); and (2) A's expectations about B's 
p r e f e r e n c e s , B's r e s o u r c e s , B's use of these r e s o u r c e s , and the 
probability of B's compliance with A's p r e f e r e n c e s . 
Without introducing the idea as an assumption of our t h e o r y , 
we note that the concept of an expectation implies that some 
elements at least of the power/compliance relation are s t a b l e . 
For expectations change if and only if behavior is incongruent 
with t h e m . But e x p e c t a t i o n s , once f o r m e d , are important 
determinants of behavior and the behavior that they determine is 
congruent with e x p e c t a t i o n s . They t e n d , t h e r e f o r e , to maintain 
themselves once f o r m e d . 
Expectations do not change the conditions under which 
compliance o c c u r s , but they do change the rate at which A openly 
expresses p r e f e r e n c e s , promises r e w a r d s , and/or threatens 
p e n a l t i e s . T h u s , the second assumption we adopt is Friedrich's 
"law of anticipated reactions" (1937, 1963; also see F o r d , 1 9 8 6 ) , 
a c c o r d i n g to which 
Assumption 2 . (LAR) For given X , r , and t , 
1. If B expects in advance that Zip^u (X) > I ^ j u f X ) , 
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then B complies with A's preferences i n d e p e n d e n t l y of any overt 
expression of p r e f e r e n c e s , p r o m i s e s , or threats by A . 
2. If A expects in advance that ^ j U (X) > S t ^ u C X ) , 
then A does not express p r e f e r e n c e s , p r o m i s e s , r e w a r d s , or 
threaten penalties to B with respect to X . 
That i s , Assumption 2 holds both that (1) A need not 
exercise power to cause compliance if B knows already what A 
prefers and that i{^u(r) + ^ — u C t ) exceeds the disutility of 
compliance and (2) that A will not demand X of B if it is highly 
likely that B will resist and the costs of using power exceed the 
expected g a i n . 
Note that not only will compliance often occur without A 
overtly voicing d e m a n d s , p r o m i s e s , or t h r e a t s , but in the case of 
coercion A does not even overtly use p e n a l t i e s . 
A and B m a y e a c h , in a d d i t i o n , form expectations about- the 
other's e x p e c t a t i o n s . These we refer to as second-order 
e x p e c t a t i o n s , consisting of (1) A's expectations about B's 
expectations about A's p r e f e r e n c e s , A's r e s o u r c e s , the 
probability that A uses t h e m , and the probability of A's 
compliance with any preferences of B and (2) B's expectations 
about A's expectations about B's p r e f e r e n c e s , B's r e s o u r c e s , the 
probability that B uses t h e m , and B's compliance with any 
preferences of A ' s . When such expectations form on both s i d e s , 
we refer to this as snared awareness of the components that go 
into d e t e r m i n i n g use of and compliance with p o w e r . 
About shared a w a r e n e s s , we assume that when first and 
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second-order expectations are either absent or i n c o n g r u e n t , power 
becomes more o v e r t , more v i s i b l e . If A knows that B knows 
exactly what A will do to compel X there is no need for A to 
express p r e f e r e n c e s , promise r e w a r d s , or threaten penalties 
(which follows from the L A R ) . But if A expects that B expects 
more or less than A will d o , it becomes necessary to exercise 
power o v e r t l y . This will be necessary if 3 expects less because 
B is therefore less likely to c o m p l y . If B expects m o r e , it will 
be necessary to renegotiate terms of e x c h a n g e . S i m i l a r l y , if B 
knows that A knows exactly what reward or penalty will induce B 





 j u (t) exceeds u(X) - u ( X ) . But if B does not know 
what A expects him to e x p e c t , or believes that what A expects is 
less than B will actually take to do X , then either noncompliance 
or renegotiation of t e r m s , either of which are likely to lead to 
open s t r u g g l e s , are more l i k e l y . (In B's c a s e , incongruence that 
promises too much reward probably does not lead to any 
renegotiation on B's side.) 
T h u s , we assume in addition to the L A R , a "law of shared 
awareness," which holds that 
Assumption 3 . (LSA) For given X , r , and t , 
1. If A knows B's expectations for A , overt expression 
of p r e f e r e n c e s , p r o m i s e s , and/or threats by A occurs if and 
only if A's second-order expectations are incongruent with 
A's actual preferences and willingness to use r e s o u r c e s . 
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2. If B knows A's expectations for B , noncompliance 
and retaliation occur if and only if either 
1. the SEU of noncompliance exceeds that of 
c o m p l i a n c e , 
2 . or B's second-order expectations for A are 
less than B's actual preferences and terms of c o m p l i a n c e . 
T h u s , not only does A not need to overtly express p r e f e r e n c e s , 
p r o m i s e s , and threats or overtly use p e n a l t i e s , A knows that they 
are not n e c e s s a r y . Hence their overt use is less l i k e l y . Overt 
power on either side is more likely when o n e , the o t h e r , or both 
either do not know what the other expects or believe that they do 
know (correctly or not) but believe that the other's expectations 
are w r o n g . 
Part I I I . I m p l i c a t i o n s . 
At least four implications may be logically derived from 
shared a w a r e n e s s . These are: (1) power is less visible than SEU 
theory would p r e d i c t , (2) it is more s t a b l e , (3) the process 
itself amplifies p o w e r , and C O under some conditions instant 
emergence of expectations is p o s s i b l e . 
A . V i s i b i l i t y of P o w e r . 
The most immediate implication of the LAR and LSA 
assumptions is that overt exercise of power is seldom visible 
once expectations f o r m , especially when A has more power than B . 
If A has more power than B , and expects t h a t , at i/>u(r) and ^ u (t), 
the utility of X exceeds that of X , A expects 3 to comply with 
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his/her preferences; whereas B expects A to reward him/her with r 
in return for compliance or penalize him/her with t for 
n o n c o m p l i a n c e . Given these first-order e x p e c t a t i o n s , A is 
unlikely to express d i r e c t i v e s , threats or promises in order to 
attain B's c o m p l i a n c e . It will be u n n e c e s s a r y . By the same 
t o k e n , B is unlikely to express threats of retaliation or demand 
a specific r e w a r d , r , for his/her c o m p l i a n c e . 
Given second-order expectations (i.e., A knows that B knows, 
B knows that A k n o w s . . . ) , A is even less likely to penalize B and 
B is less likely to retaliate than o t h e r w i s e , since they both 
share the same e x p e c t a t i o n s , i . e . expectations and behavior are 
c o n g r u e n t , a n d , t h e r e f o r e , both correctly anticipate behavior and 
o u t c o m e s . 
As a result especially of shared a w a r e n e s s , power therefore 
plays an almost invisible role in interpersonal r e l a t i o n s . 
Neither acts of power or acts of counter-power (retaliation) need 
to be overtly exercised by either p a r t y . The theory p r e d i c t s , in 
f a c t , that'if A has more power than B , A exercises overt power 
only when B is not expected to comply but the value of u(X) to A 
is greater than the costs of exercising power; or when A has no 
second-order expectations about B's expectations; or when A's 
second-order expectations are incongruent with A's actual u ( X ) , 
if»u(r), and \pu(t). On B's s i d e , B openly struggles with A only if 
B expects that i/>u(r) + ^u(t) is less than the difference between 
u(X) - u ( X ) , or B has no second-order expectations about A's 
e x p e c t a t i o n s , or when B's second-order expectations are 
incongruent with B's actual u ( X ) , u ( r ) , u ( t ) , and probability of 
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c o m p l i a n c e . From this theoretical v i e w p o i n t , it is no wonder 
than open threats of promises are rarely expressed in work 
relations between superordinates and their subordinates in 
conjunction with routine assignments and task p e r f o r m a n c e . The 
invisibility of power in such cases is mainly a result of shared 
awareness concerning both sides' p r e f e r e n c e s , r e s o u r c e s , and 
probabilities of a c t i o n . It a p p e a r s , h o w e v e r , that exercise of 
power and retaliatory attempts are quite common in parent-child 
r e l a t i o n s . This pattern of visible power may be mainly due to 
the fact that parents doubt the emergence of first-order 
expectations in younger c h i l d r e n . 
B . Stability of P o w e r . 
Our theory of expectations predicts that power is much more 
"sticky" than any other theory would have s u g g e s t e d . "Stability" 
refers in the first instance to the s t a b i l i t y of the expectations 
underlying p o w e r / c o m p l i a n c e , which are stable if and only if the 
expectations with which an exchange begins are unchanged by its 
o u t c o m e . This should be reflected in stability of the observable 
behavior of A and B , i . e . of their use of and compliance with 
p o w e r , with respect to X through t i m e . Stability in power 
relations is a property which emerges from two u n d e r l y i n g trends: 
continuity and r e g u l a r i t y . Continuity is the length of time that 
a given power-dependence relationship between two or more persons 
p e r s i s t s . R e g u l a r i t y is the amount of variation in A's and B's 
modes of behavior over time: H e n c e , the extent to which 
participants are likely to behave in a predictable way at any 
given point of t i m e . Both are positively affected by shared 
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awareness of mutual e x p e c t a t i o n s . 
Without the effect of e x p e c t a t i o n s , four forces are likely 
to drive power relations to discontinuities (cf scction i): (a) 
actual resources are subject to considerable fluctuations due to 
changes both in the a c t o r s ' stocks of resources and the external 
conditions under which they operate; (b) the utilities attached 
to outcomes decline as a function of repetitive transactions; (c) 
frequent use of threats and promises exerts pressure from which 
actors attempt to escape or which generates resistence; and (d) 
each exercise of power is independent of its past and f u t u r e . 
Mot all of these are affected by e x p e c t a t i o n s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , expectations change at a much slower pace than 
actual r e s o u r c e s . The basic property of any "expectation" 
concept is that it causes behavior that is congruent with i t s e l f . 
While change in expectations will occur (probabilistically) if 
behavior is incongruent with t h e m , incongruent behavior is in 
fact u n l i k e l y to occur except for the effects of exogenous 
f a c t o r s . If the Law of Shared Awareness h o l d s , only incongruence 
between an actor's second-order expectations and actual 
p r e f e r e n c e s , r e s o u r c e s , and likely reactions gives rise to change 
in e x p e c t a t i o n s . "Expectations" therefore introduce a quite 
stable element into the otherwise fluctuating power of A over B . 
They do not counteract the changing marginal utility of u ( X ) , 
u(r) and u ( t ) , but they do introduce a past and a future into the 
AB r e l a t i o n , and because they decrease its visibility they also 
reduce the resistence created by the overt exercise of p o w e r . 
T h u s , the effect of expectations is to increase the 
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continuity of the relation A > B . They also increase r e g u l a r i t y , 
because by definition they increase p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . There are 
fewer u n e x p e c t e d , p r o v o c a t i v e , acts by either a c t o r , less need to 
test the credibility of either's promises or t h r e a t s . Each can 
anticipate in a predictable way the consequences of their acts in 
terms of the other's likely behavior. 
C . The Emergence of E x p e c t a t i o n s . 
Of the four ways that actors can form expectations for each 
o t h e r , three are i n d i r e c t . The fact that expectations can be 
created by means other than direct experience implies that actors 
A and B can enter a new relationship with already formed 
e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , the level of d e p e n d e n c e , expected 
c o m p l i a n c e , expected s a n c t i o n s , or expected retaliation which 
determine both exercise of power and compliance can be determined 
i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y . Such predetermined e x p e c t a t i o n s , t h e n , motivate 
both a c t o r s , A and B , to behave in a specific m a n n e r at the 
outset of their r e l a t i o n . Pre-formed expectations probably play 
such a role mainly in well-structured social c o n t e x t s , as in 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , in which r u l e s , p r o c e d u r e s , ranks and symbols 
reduce the level of a m b i g u i t y . S i m i l a r l y , in traditional 
families spouses may come to their marriage with strictly defined 
expectations c o n c e r n i n g , among other t h i n g s , their relative power 
and its derived modes of b e h a v i o r . T h u s , a causal-chain of 
effects may be postulated between structural s e t t i n g s , 
instantaneous e x p e c t a t i o n s , and the exercise of p o w e r , 
c o m p l i a n c e , and r e t a l i a t i o n . That there is sometimes less than 
instantaneous emergence is due to variations in the extent to 
which expectations are p r e - f o r m e d . 
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D . Amplification of P o w e r . 
Expectations in fact appear often in the literature on power 
as "reputational" effects of power (e.g. G a m s o n , 1966). One of 
the important consequences of reputations for power is that they 
amplify the amount of A's power over B . That i s , as expectations 
emerge the rate of B's compliance with A's preferences increases 
even if the actual stock of A's resources does n o t . 
This effect occurs for three r e a s o n s . F i r s t , one effect of 
expectations is that at least t is seldom actually r e q u i r e d . 
While expenditures of r will be n e c e s s a r y , the total costs of the 
exercise of power are reduced by the fact that threats seldom 
need to be carried o u t . In cases where the only inducement 
employed is t h r e a t s , expectations in fact preserve the stock of 
resources relatively u n c h a n g e d . This inflates the actual stock 
of A's resources by comparison with models in which there are no 
expectations for p o w e r . But s e c o n d , because expectations are 
"reputations" for power they also add a resource to A's s t o c k . 
The effect is not unlike that Parsons' (1963) attributes to power 
in the c o l l e c t i v e , "power to" s e n s e , though it will in general 
not be true that interpersonal power is therefore a variable-sum 
q u a n t i t y . (That i s , even amplified power will be O-sum for 
"power o v e r . " ) A given stock of resources makes possible 
something like the extension of "credit," i . e . more power can be 
created by the same actual resources as reputations for power 
e m e r g e . H e n c e , reputations pyramid the amount of p o w e r . T h i r d , 
stability itself amplifies p o w e r . Actual resource stocks 
fluctuate more than expectations d o . Expectations therefore 
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introduce a s t e a d y i n g hand on the flow of p o w e r , but are 
especially significant in m a i n t a i n i n g the reputed level of 
resources when they are in fact d e c r e a s i n g . So long as the 
decrease is not s e c u l a r , i . e . a long-term d e c l i n e , the correction 
of downside fluctuations has the effect of increasing A's overall 
power over B . 
I V . C o n t i n g e n c i e s . 
The fact that expectations "emerge" suggests the obvious 
possibility that at different stages of their emergence 
expectations differ in how certain the actor is of t h e m . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , that they emerge in different ways and have 
different sources may give rise to additional u n c e r t a i n t i e s . We 
must therefore think of expectations as w e a k e r or s t r o n g e r , in 
the sense of being more or less c e r t a i n . And the magnitude of 
the effects claimed for expectations in section III should be 
proportional to their c e r t a i n t y . 
A . Effects of U n c e r t a i n t y . 
One way to think of what "emergence" means (in the context 
of power) is that expectations begin to form t h a t , with t i m e , 
become both stronger and more widely s h a r e d . H e n c e , to the 
extent that expectations are not at first c e r t a i n , the rate of 
emergence is s l o w e r , and the greater the uncertainty the slower 
the rate of emergence ought to b e . 
A slower rate of emergence immediately i m p l i e s , of c o u r s e , 
that the amount of power created by uncertain expectations should 
be less than that created by certain e x p e c t a t i o n s , hence there 
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should be less amplification of the amount of power. 
On the other h a n d , visibility will be greater with 
u n c e r t a i n t y . F o r , in part, it is visible power that creates 
e x p e c t a t i o n s . There are actually two somewhat different ways 
power may be made v i s i b l e , of course; by "real" use and by 
symbolic u s e . One can think of a kind of gestural politics in 
whilch A and B give off cues to each other (and to other parties) 
about their p r e f e r e n c e s , r e s o u r c e s , and probable r e a c t i o n s , in 
order to create e x p e c t a t i o n s , in the way that Reagan's aides 
continually talk of "giving signals" to G o r b a c h e v . Uncertainty 
should increase visibility by increasing one or the other of 
these kinds of public display of p o w e r . 
F i n a l l y , uncertainty should decrease stability of power 
r e l a t i o n s . That i s , not only will stability take longer to 
e m e r g e , which follows from the conclusions already reached about 
e m e r g e n c e , but the w e a k e r the expectations at any given point the 
greater the likelihood that some kind of change will take p l a c e . 
This follows simply from the fact that the weaker the 
e x p e c t a t i o n s , the greater the likelihood of behavior incongruent 
with e x p e c t a t i o n s , hence the greater the endogenous pressures for 
c h a n g e . 
Despite its i m p o r t a n c e , we have made no attempt to 
exhaustively study all the factors that give rise to certainty or 
uncertainty in e x p e c t a t i o n s . But we wish to call attention to at 
least four: ( 1 ) c o n s e n s u s , ( 2 ) the sources of e x p e c t a t i o n s , ( 3 ) 
validation of expectations by o t h e r s , and (4) the sharing of 
symbols of p o w e r . 
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B . C o n s e n s u s , C o n g r u e n c e , and C e r t a i n t y . 
To the extent that B's first-order expectations for A are 
the complement of A's first-order expectations for B we can say 
that their first-order expectations are congruent and they share 
a consensus about e x p e c t a t i o n s . B's expectations for A 
complement A's expectations about B w h e n , for e x a m p l e , if A 
supposes that s/he is superior in power to B then B at the same 
time supposes that B is inferior in power to A . (This can be 
made more precise in terms of actual SEU v a l u e s , but greater 
precision is unnecessary for present purposes.) If A supposes 
that A and B arc e q u a l , then B complements A if B also supposes 
that they are e q u a l . F i n a l l y , if A supposes that B is superior 
in power to A , B is the complement of A if B supposes that A is 
inferior to B . 
To the extent that A and B do not share a consensus about 
their respective roles in the r e l a t i o n , behavior caused by 
expectations should be incongruent with the expectations of at 
least one of t h e m . T h i s , in t u r n , should induce a higher level 
of uncertainty about the actor's expectations for the o t h e r , 
driving the process towards some change in e x p e c t a t i o n s . 
T h u s , dissensus should have the effect of slowing e m e r g e n c e , 
deflating p o w e r , inducing more visible exercise of p o w e r , and 
decreasing s t a b i l i t y . 
The role of c o n s e n s u s , h o w e v e r , is not limited to 
first-order e x p e c t a t i o n s . An important form of it already 
referred to in section III is congruence between second-order 
expectations and actual preferences, r e s o u r c e s , and r e a c t i o n s . 
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One may in fact think of a triadic relation between one actor's 
actual state (say A ' s ) , the other's first-order expectations of 
that state (say B ' s ) , and of the first actor's second-order 
expectations about the other's e x p e c t a t i o n s . This triadic 
relation is illustrated in F i g . 1, in which the "actual" level is 
denoted the "zeroth" l e v e l . 
ACTOR 
Level of Expectations A B 
2 A expects that B 
expects that u ( X ) , 
1 * ( r , t ) B expects u(X) , 4"(r ,t) 
0 u (X), (r, t) 
F i g . 1. Congruence between expectations at different l e v e l s . 
It should be evident from F i g . 1, however primitive its 
representation of the features in actual power/compliance 
s i t u a t i o n s , that consensus depends not only on similarities in 
first-order expectations but also across l e v e l s . If A and B do 
not share a first-order c o n s e n s u s , this will be evident to each 
of t h e m , if second-order expectations e x i s t , because of 
incongruence between second-order expectations and what each 
actor expects of h i m / h e r s e l f . As a r e s u l t , uncertainty of 
expectations about the other should be g r e a t e r . If second-order 
expectations do not e x i s t , the LSA assumption implies that the 
"consensus" is i n c o m p l e t e , which will have the same e f f e c t . The 
result in either case will be more visible use of p o w e r , slower 
e m e r g e n c e , less amplification of power and less s t a b i l i t y . 
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C . The Effect of Differences Among Sources of E x p e c t a t i o n s . 
Some point was made in section III of the fact that there 
are a number of different sources of expectations in addition to 
direct e x p e r i e n c e . One may therefore think of the more indirect 
sources as differing both in the quantity and quality of the 
"information" they provide the a c t o r . Some of them are highly 
institutionalized and therefore probably unquestioned and 
u n q u e s t i o n a b l e . Some of them are u n i q u e , and therefore 
i d i o s y n c r a t i c , to the particular s o u r c e . 
W h i l e a rather complicated theory of this subject could 
probably be d e v e l o p e d , one obvious starting place is to think 
simply of the amount of certainty that can be created by (1) the 
number and consistency of sources that provide the same 
information and (2) the credibility of the s o u r c e , for e x a m p l e , 
its status v a l u e . If a large number of well-placed people 
consistently believe in A's power, for e x a m p l e , the certainty 
with which B believes in the expectations they transmit about A 
should i n c r e a s e , which should accelerate e m e r g e n c e , inflate 
power, decrease v i s i b i l i t y , and increase s t a b i l i t y . 
D . Social V a l i d a t i o n , Social S u p p o r t , and C e r t a i n t y . 
To the extent that objective reality itself is not 
sufficient to validate the "information" provided by individual 
and cultural s o u r c e s , its reality is "social," i . e . depends on 
the beliefs of people around A and B . If C is a third party to 
the relation of A to B , to the extent that C shares the same 
e x p e c t a t i o n s , acts by C that are consistent with them socially 
validates them for A and B . T h u s , other people are not only the 
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s o u r c e s , they are also the guarantors of expectations about 
power. 
But over and above the impact of C on the certainty with 
which A and B hold expectations for each o t h e r , there is the fact 
that third parties imply a new kind of e x p e c t a t i o n , expectations 
of support by C . Interpersonal relations typically take place in 
larger social c o n t e x t s . An important effect of parties like C is 
more or less support for the use of power by A and B's compliance 
with i t . Support will frequently be e x p e c t e d , by both A and B , 
for exercises of power by A that are within culturally defined 
limits. On the other h a n d , n o n c o m p l i a n c e , even r e s i s t e n c e , by B 
will often be supported by C if it appears justified by 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . For e x a m p l e , noncompliance is likely to be 
supported in cases of child a b u s e , sexual h a r a s s m e n t , or immoral 
d e m a n d s . 
We are not trying to offer a theory of the causes of social 
s u p p o r t . It may derive from l e g i t i m a c y , from material i n t e r e s t , 
from sentiments (such as liking for A or B ) , or any number of 
other m o t i v e s . What matters is that both A and B have 
expectations about who and what C will and will not s u p p o r t . 
These third-party expectations will in the first instance 
affect A and B's actual behavior. If C is expected by A to 
support B's n o n c o m p l i a n c e , A is less likely to use p o w e r . If C 
is expected by B to support n o n c o m p l i a n c e , B is less likely to 
c o m p l y . Because they are a factor in A and B's b e h a v i o r , 
third-party expectations affect the congruence between behavior 
and e x p e c t a t i o n s . H e n c e , validation is a source of certainty not 
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only d i r c c t l y , because of its effects on e x p e c t a t i o n s , but also 
indirectly because of its effects on behavioral congruence with 
e x p e c t a t i o n s , If C's b e h a v i o r , and A's and B's expectations of 
C's b e h a v i o r , are incongruent with A's and B's first-order 
expectations for each o t h e r , the effect is to increase 
uncertainty first of all because A's and B's expectations have 
less social validity and second of all because they have less 
anticipated s u p p o r t , changing actual b e h a v i o r . The two effects 
taken together will decrease s t a b i l i t y , deflate p o w e r , and 
increase v i s i b i l i t y . 
E . The Effect of Symbols of Power on C e r t a i n t y . 
The process of emergence is frequently associated with 
"gestural" p o l i t i c s , i . e . public displays of power the purpose of 
which is to create (or m a i n t a i n ) expectations about i n t e n t i o n s , 
r e s o u r c e s , and willingness to use t h e m . Sometimes this involves 
actual use of p o w e r , i . e . overt d e m a n d s , p r o m i s e s , t h r e a t s , 
r e w a r d s , p e n a l t i e s , used less to induce compliance than to create 
or maintain expectations about future use o f , support f o r , or 
compliance with p o w e r . But sometimes what it involves is 
symbolic power ritually d i s p l a y e d . 
Some of these displays are symbols of the potential use of 
p o w e r , like such symbols of the police power as visibly worn 
s i d e a r m s , c l u b s , and h a n d c u f f s . Some are symbols of d e f e r e n c e , 
of potential compliance with power, such as the m i l i t a r y s a l u t e . 
By means of such s y m b o l s , r i t u a l s , like reveille and retreat on a 
military b a s e , transmit expectations to new members and maintain 
them for already socialized m e m b e r s . They a f f e c t , first of a l l , 
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the actual or potential objects of power; but they also are 
important for the actual or potential users of i t , for they also 
create expectations that one iias power to use and that others 
support its u s e . 
While some symbols and rituals are well i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d , 
like reveille and r e t r e a t , some are less widely s h a r e d , even 
unique to a particular A and B . The gavel will probably create 
immediate u n d e r s t a n d i n g of who is in authority in a c o u r t r o o m , 
but in a delinquent gang it would be understood with a different 
m e a n i n g e n t i r e l y , adding nothing to a u t h o r i t y . 
Ceremonial display of less institutionalized rituals and 
symbols will create less certain expectations either in users or 
objects of p o w e r . To the extent that less w e l l - i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d 
symbols or rituals create less c e r t a i n t y , t'ney should decelerate 
e m e r g e n c e , deflate the amount of power, and create less stable 
p o w e r . The effect on the visibility of power is perhaps more 
complicated because symbol and ritual are themselves significant 
only to the extent that they visibly display p o w e r . But there 
are nevertheless two ways in which more w i d e l y institutionalized 
symbols and rituals of power reduce its v i s i b i l i t y . F i r s t , 
visible symbols of tne institutions of p o w e r , like police 
w e a p o n r y , so widely diffuse e x p e c t a t i o n s , and gives them so much 
c e r t a i n t y , that no particular exchange between any particular A 
and B is required to establish t h e m . H e n c e , particular gestural 
politics are not n e e d e d . S e c o n d l y , when particular gestural 
politics do occur it is possible to carry them on at a largely 
symbolic l e v e l , reducing the visible use of "real" p o w e r s , such 
as firing weapons or w i e l d i n g c l u b s . 
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V . Summary and C o n c l u s i o n . 
Our starting point is a s u b j e c t i v e - e x p e c t e d - u t i l i t y (SEU) 
theory of interpersonal power. By "power" we refer to tne use of 
rewards and/or penalties to induce or coerce c o m p l i a n c e . In an 
SEU t h e o r y , power is used if the gain from its use exceeds the 
c o s t . The gain depends on the sum of the subjective v a l u e s , or 
u t i l i t i e s , of the various possible outcomes of using power each 
multiplied by the subjective probability of the o u t c o m e . Costs 
are obtained in the same w a y , depending in part on hoxv likely it 
is that the other c o m p l i e s . Compliance itself occurs if the sum 
of the SEU of rewards and penalties exceeds the difference in SEU 
between noncompliance and c o m p l i a n c e . 
The subjective probabilities of an SEU theory are one kind 
of e x p e c t a t i o n , about probable future use of rewards/penalties 
and c o m p l i a n c e . Relative to SEU t h e o r i e s , we further complicate 
the expectations involved in power by introducing more s o u r c e s , 
k i n d s , and levels of t h e m . Sources include not only direct 
experience of A and B with each other but also various indirect 
sources such as socialization to a pre-given t r a d i t i o n , Kinds 
include not only expected reactions but also preferences and 
r e s o u r c e s . Levels include not only first-order but second-order 
e x p e c t a t i o n s . (First-order expectations include A's expectations 
about the p r e f e r e n c e s , r e s o u r c e s , and reactions of B and B's 
expectations about the preferences, r e s o u r c e s , and reactions of 
A . Second-order expectations include A's expectations about B's 
expectations about A and B's expectations about A's expectations 
about B.) 
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A system of expectations that is c o m p l e t e , i . e . all first-
and second-order expectations e x i s t , and about which A and B are 
certain implies (1) that expectations in any particular instance 
emerge instantaneously; (2) that the amount of power created by a 
given stock of resources is a m p l i f i e d , i . e . that expectations 
induce a greater amount of compliance; (3) that the amount of 
power they create is relatively s t a b l e , creating the conditions 
of its own persistence; but (4) that power is much less visible 
than any otner theory of compliant actions p r e d i c t s . 
But the m a g n i t u d e of these effects depends on the certainty 
and completeness of the e x p e c t a t i o n s . The less certain and 
complete they a r e , the slower the e m e r g e n c e , the less they 
amplify p o w e r , the less stable power i s , and the greater its 
v i s i b i l i t y . 
No attempt is made to exhaustively treat all sources of 
c e r t a i n t y , but four that are important are: (1) Consensus 
between the expectations of A and B and congruence of their 
behavior with these expectations; (2) The s t a t u s , n u m b e r , and 
consistency of third parties, C , nho transmit expectations to A 
and B; ( 3 ) The extent of social validation and expected support 
by third p a r t i e s , C , once expectations are formed; and (4) the 
extent to which symbols that communicate about power are 
institutionalized in the system of which A and B are p a r t . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. We assume that the utility of penalties is n e g a t i v e . We omit 
subscripts for i j )U(r) and ij>u(t) but note that they may or may 
not take the same value of . 
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